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Abstract
This paper analyzes how noisy or imprecise announcements might partially remove the
inefficiencies resulting from thecredibility problem in monetary policy when the presence of non-
verifiable private information adds anotherdimension to that problem. The analysis finds that
imprecise or noisy announcements can be a meaningful form of communication only if it is
possible to “tie” thehands ofthe monetary authority somehow. To the extent that it is otherwise
efficient for policy to react to the monetary authority’s private information, such announcements
can be extremely costly in terms of the sacrifice in flexibility required to make them relevant.
Surprisingly, the conditions under which the monetary authority can make more precise
announcements are identical to those under which the monetary authorityis less likely to prefer
the noisy announcement equilibrium.
Michelle R. Garfinkel Seonghwan Oh
Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis UniversityofCalifornia
411 Locust Street Los Angeles, CA 90032
St. Louis, MO63102
We thank, without implication, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Guido Tabellini and theparticipants of
the UCLA money workshop for helpful comments and discussions.1 Introduction
To what extent should secrecy be permitted in theformulation and implementation of
monetary policy? An argument against monetary policy secrecy follows easily from
economic theory. Specifically, one could argue secrecy is not desirable as it limits
the informational content of prices in financial markets and thereby detracts from an
efficient allocation of resources.1 Applying the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel
(1982), however, Stein (1989) develops a theoretical explanation for secrecy. In his
analysis, secrecy is an unavoidable consequence ofthe strategic aspects of policy. The
basic idea is that, although the monetary authority would like to reveal its private
information truthfully, it cannot do so precisely. The monetary authority’s incentive,
recognized by the market, to manipulate expectations whereby it can achieve a bet-
ter outcome detracts from the credibility of its announcements to reveal its private
information. But, by making noisy or imprecise announcements about its private
information, the monetary authority can reveal this information credibly, though not
perfectly. Because the announcement only partly communicates this information,
some secrecy remains.
This paper further investigates the effectiveness and limits of noisy announce-
ments by applying Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) work to a slight variation of Can-
zoneri’s (1985) moregeneral economicframework. This application, which generalizes
Stein’s (1989) analysis, captures awell-known, fundamental trade-off that potentially
emerges when the monetary authority possesses some private information relevant for
policy—namely, a trade-off between discipline to prevent the monetary authority from
pursuing suboptimal policies biased toward inflation2 and flexibility to permit the
monetary authority to react efficiently to disturbances in the economy.3
Such a trade-off is driven in the analysis by the way in which the essence of the
credibility problem inmonetary policy is characterized. First, the credibility problem
1is two-fold in the sense that even if there were no private information, a credibility
problem in monetary policy would remain because the efficient policy is not dynami-
cally consistent; private information adds another dimension to the problem.4 Second,
the nature of this credibility problem is such that, without any restrictions on policy,
the monetary authority’s incentive to manipulate wage setters’ expectations so as to
create surprise inflation is independent of its private information. The present analy-
sis finds that, in this case, noisy announcements alone are impotent even in partially
resolving the credibility problem. The analysis is enriched by the assumption, bor-
rowed from Canzoneri (1985), that the monetary authority’s private information is
never directly observed by the public sothat its private information is not verifiable.
This assumption precludes the possibility ofreputational considerations or some com-
mitment technology supporting the efficient outcome. Otherwise, as in Stein (1989),
the credibility problem might be mitigated easily without sacrificing any flexibility.
Indeed, the present analysis argues that, given the characterization of the credi-
bility problem briefly described above, combined with the assumption that the mon-
etary authority’s private information is never directly observed by the public, noisy
announcements will be useful only under very restrictive conditions. Specifically,
noisy announcements can be meaningful only if it is possible to tie the monetary
authority’s hands somehow. By limiting flexibility in policy, it is possible to link the
monetary authority’s incentive to manipulate expectations to its private information
and thereby make noisy announcements believable. But, if it is otherwise beneficial
for the monetary authority to react to its private information, noisy announcements
can be extremely costly in terms of the sacrifice in flexibility required to make them
meaningful. Thus, the analysis shows generally that noisy announcements need not
always be preferred by the monetary authority. Moreover, the analysis shows that
the conditions under which noisy announcements are more likely to be preferred are
identical to those conditions under which the announcements are less informative.
2This analysis suggests, then, that the trade-off between the benefits of discipline and
flexibility in policy that is heightened by the presence of private information might
not be mitigated with noisy announcements.
In what follows, the next section presents the basic framework to analyzemonetary
policy with private information and shows that, although monetary authority would
like to reveal this information, it cannot do so truthfully and precisely. Section 3
derives the conditions under which noisy announcements can and cannot enhance
the monetary authority’s welfare. Finally, section 4 offers some concluding remarks,
including a possible extension of the analysis.
2 A Model of Strategic Monetary Policy with Private Information
The analysis builds on aslight variation ofCanzoneri’s (1985) model, whichprovides a
general frameworkfor examining the implications ofprivate information formonetary
policy and characterizing the equilibrium with noisy announcements.5 The supply
function is a standard rational expectations one:
yt=yTh+0(irt—irfl 0>0, (1)
where y~denotes the log of output in time t and yfl denotes the log of output corre-
sponding to the natural rate ofunemployment; lrt denotes the rate ofinflation realized
at the end of time t; and ir~ denotes wage setters’ expectations of inflation conditional
on information available to the public at the beginning of time t as specified below.
The following simple quantity theory equation determines the equilibrium price
level:
mt — Pt = — Vt, (2)
where mt and Pt denote respectively the logs of the money supply and the price level
in time t; and, Vt is an innovation to money demand assumed to follow a random
3walk.
The equilibrium inflation rate is obtained by taking the first-difference of (2),
gt—71t=St,
where S~ = Vt_i — Vt and gt equals the growth rate of money, the monetary authority’s
instrument. St is an i.i.d.random variablewith a zero unconditional mean and afinite
variance, a~.
To make the notion of secrecy operational in this model, assume that, in contrast
to wage setters, the monetary authority has a forecast ofthis disturbance.6 Its private
forecast, ft E(S~),satisfies
St=ft+et, (4)
where e~,the monetary authority’s forecast error, has an expected value of zero, a
finite variance, o-~, and no correlation with the forecast. In this section, ft is assumed
to be serially uncorrelated. (The case where ft is serially correlated is discussed in
section 4.) In contrast to Canzoneri (1985), the present analysis assumes this forecast
is madejust before wages are set. But, inthe absence ofany announcements, 7r~= g~.
Moreover, although wage setters observe the disturbance to money demand, S~, after
monetary policy is implemented and prices are determined, they cannot distinguish
the monetary authority’s forecast from its forecast error. This non-verifiability as-
sumption enriches the analysis as will become obvious below.
To study the behavior of the monetary authority, the analysis assumes that the
monetary authority has two goals: output and inflation stabilization. In period t, its
utility is given by
Ut = —(yt — ky”)2
— S(~rt— lr*)2, k > 1 (5)
where k> 1 reflects the notion that the monetary authority desires to bring output
beyond its natural level.7 The parameter si sthe weight the monetary authority
4places on its objective of stabilizing inflation around its target level, 7r*, relative to
its objective of hitting its output target, ky”.
Using (1) and (3), the monetary authority’s utility in period t (5) can be written
as
Uj ~ (6)
where, fornotational simplicity, y~ = (k—i)ç and ~ = j~-.The monetary authority’s
problem, then, is to choose g,~to maximize the expected value of (6) given f~.As
shown below, the solution depends on howthe monetary authority treats wage setters’
expectations. As indicated above, the absence of any meaningful announcements
implies S~ = 0.
2.1 The Efficient Solution
First consider the benchmark casein whichthere exists a full commitment technology
to force the monetary authority to truthfully reveal through an announcement, for
example, its private information and to adhere to a contingent rule so that it could
essentially influence wage setters’ expectations in a way that is consistent with its
policy. Then, the optimal monetary policy, denoted by ~, is
(7)
for t = 1, ~ Wage setters set ~ = lr*. With these expectations, the policy in (7)
yields the following expected one-period utility to the monetary authority,
= —(1 + q~)o~ — y~2. (8)
Note that the money growth rule in (7) completely accommodates the predicted
component of money demand shocks to stabilize inflation, but it does not attempt
to create surprise inflation in a fruitless effort to increase output above the natural
level.
52.2 No Announcements: The Full-Discretionary Solution
Alternatively, suppose the monetary authority takes wage setters’ expectations as
given. That is to say, the monetary authority makes no announcements about its
policy or about its forecast, as if it were ignoring any possible impact that it could
haveon expectations. In this case, the monetary authority chooses gt to maximize the
expected value (6) conditional on its forecast of the disturbance to money demand,
subject to (3) andtaking ir~ as given. The wagesetters’ (unconditional) expectation of
the associated first-order condition, with 5 = 0, impliesg~= lr* + ~-. By substituting
get back into the first-order condition, one can verify that money growth under this
regime, denoted by ~, is
(9)
for t = 1,2,.... Note that the solution concept employed here is identical to that
which typically is referred to as the one-shot, Nash or the full-discretionary solution in
the literature. The important feature of this policy is that it generates an inflationary
bias, ~
The inefficiency of this solution is revealed by comparing the expected one-period
utility to the monetary authority, in this regime, given by
(10)
to that obtained in the efficient regime, given by (8). The difference between (8) and
(10), ~, captures the disutility ofthe inflationary bias. Without a commitment tech-
nology to force the monetary authority to truthfully reveal its private information,
this inflationary bias is not easily mitigated.
62.3 Full Announcements: Cheating
Suppose, in contrast to the previous section, the monetary authority attempts to
reveal its private information through (full) announcements to achieve the efficient
solution and avoidthe inflationary bias. As Canzoneri (1985) shows, however, making
truthful (precise) announcements is not incentive compatible. Specifically, given its
private information and its influence on wage setters’ expectations, the monetary
authority would always announce that it will adhere to the efficient policy:
(11)
wheref~ is the monetary authority’s announcement of its private forecast. But,
given g~= g~and S~ = fe”, the monetary authority has an incentive to lie about its
forecast according to
f~=ft+1~. (12).
By misrepresenting its forecast while following the announced policy in (11), the
monetary authority could disguise its optimal cheating policy, given by
g~CH=f~f~~Y, (13)
as the efficient policy. If such a cheating policy were possible, it could increase the
monetary authority’s utility by ~
Of course, rational wage setters recognize the monetary authority’s incentive to
cheat; hence, as argued by Kydland and Prescott (1977), among others, wage setters
would not expect the monetary authority to follow the efficient policy and would
incorporate the inflationary bias into their expectation of monetary policy and, ac-
cordingly, into their expectations forinflation. The result is that full announcements
are not credible and, consequently, not an effective method by which the equilib-
rium inflationary bias can be alleviated; the equilibrium with full announcements is
identical to the full-discretionary solution characterized above.
7It is important to note that the presence of private information limits the effec-
tiveness of possible solutions to the credibility problem. Specifically, because the
forecast is non-verifiable private information, a legislative approach depending on
that information is not operational to achieve a better outcome than that in the
full-discretionary solution. Similarly, in contrast to Barro and Gordon (1983), the
monetary authority’s private information obscures the relevance of reputational con-
siderations in achieving a better outcome. Although wage setters can verify that the
policy in (11) was implemented, they cannot verify that f~ = ft unless the private
forecast were always perfect (e~ = 0 for all t) or directly observable.
3 A Constant Money Growth Rule and Noisy Announcements
That the monetary authority cannot make precise announcements about its private
information does not necessarily imply that all announcements are worthless. Re-
cently, Stein (1989) applies the analysis of Crawford and Sobel (1982) to show that
the monetary authority can reveal its private information regarding its preferences
about the behavior of the exchange rate partially through imprecise or noisy an-
nouncements. That is, the monetary authority announces a range in which its target
for the exchange rate falls, rather than a specific point value. Stein refers to these
announcements as cheap talk, forthey costlessly revealat least some of the monetary
authority’s private information. Here, Crawford and Sobel’s analysis is applied to the
present model to show more generally how secrecy can be partially removed through
noisy announcements—i.e., announcements made by the monetary authority stating
the range in which its private forecast falls. This application highlights the trade-off
between discipline and flexibility in monetary policy by illustrating that such talk is
not costless in this framework. That is, noisy announcements need not be cheap.
83.1 The Cost of Cheap Talk: An Example.
Although making imprecise announcements, incontrast to signaling, is costless in that
no resources expended in the process, making this formof communication meaningful
in the present context is costly. This cost, which distinguishes the present analysis
from that of Stein, arises from the nature of the credibility problem in policy. As
indicated in the previous section, the two-dimensional nature ofthe monetary author-
ity’s credibility problem implies that even ifit were possible to make the monetary
authority reveal its private forecast, an additional commitment mechanism would be
necessary to support the first-best policy in (7). Similarly, the monetary authority’s
incentive to create surprise inflation would not disappear if it were to make noisy
announcements about its private forecast. The monetary authority would always
want to create surprise inflation given wage setters’ expectations of St conditional on
the announcement, provided that their associated expectations for inflation were less
than 7r* + 1~. Accordingly, wage setters would incorporate this incentive into their
expectations to discourage the monetary authority from creating surprise inflation.
And, the resulting outcome wouldjust be the full-discretionary equilibrium in section
2.2 without any announcements.
Moreover, without any restrictions on policy, the monetary authority’s incentive
to lie does not depend on its private forecast. This independence precludes the
possibility of implicitly imposing a cost on the monetary authority if it were to
misrepresent its private information. As a consequence, noisy announcements cannot
be credible.
Given the nature of the monetary authority’s credibility problem, limiting the
flexibility permitted in policy is necessary to ensure that the announcements contain
some information while allowing the monetary authority to avoid the inflationary
bias. In other words, a rule must be imposed somehow to tie the hands of the
9monetary authority. As indicated above, for this constraint to be effective, the rule
or legislation must be independent of the monetary authority’s private forecast. In
this paper, it is assumed that the legislation specifies a constant money growth rule.
Although a more general and less restrictive multi-period targeting rule could be
legislated, Garfinkel and Oh (1990) find that, without any announcements, the strict
constant growth rule (i.e., aone-period targeting procedure) is likely to be the optimal
finite-period targeting policy regime.8
In what follows, suppose legislation requires
= ire. (14)
Although this constant money growth rule eliminates the inflationary bias, it pre-
cludes any (otherwise efficient) accommodations to money demand disturbances. Ex-
pected utility under this regime without any announcements is given by
(15)
which will exceed that under the full-discretionary regime only if > (1 + ~
where cr~denotes the variance of the private forecast.
This condition, which highlights the trade-off faced by the monetary authority in
the presence of private information, balances the benefits of eliminating the infla-
tionary bias against the costs of limiting flexibility permitted in monetary policy to
do so. Because the legislated rule in (14) precludes any reactions to the predictable
component of the disturbance, the variance of inflation and output increase by cr~
and 02a~,respectively.
Before examining the role of noisy announcements, it is important to note that,
evenwith thisrule, the monetary authority still could not precisely reveal its forecast.
In particular, given gt = lr*, the optimal announcement is given by
f~=ft+y*. (16)
10The equation above illustrates once more that the credibility problem of monetary
policy is two-fold in the presence of non-verifiable private information. Even when
the monetary authority is required to follow a constant money growth rule, it cannot
make precise and truthful statements about its forecast. But since its expected one-
period utility would increase by o~if it were able to make such statements, the
monetary authority does not prefer full secrecy when it follows a constant money
growth rule.
3.2 Noisy Announcements
By making noisy announcements about its forecast the monetary authority can re-
duce the varianceof the forecast error ofwage setters and thereby reduce the variance
ofoutput belowthat whichobtains when it simply follows the constant money growth
rule. With noisy announcements, then, the monetary authority can enhance its own
welfare. Given that it follows the rule in (14), the monetary authority’s incentive
to manipulate expectations depends on its private forecast. This dependency im-
plies that the monetary authority can influence expectations partly by announcing
a range in which its forecast falls. The basic idea is as follows: upon an announce-
ment, wage setters revise their expectation of St from an unconditional mean of zero
to an expected value conditional on ft belonging to the announced range. Hence,
the announcement affects expectations in a discrete way. In contrast to precise (or
full) announcements, noisy announcements are credible in equilibrium because the
monetary authority would have to incur a sufficiently large cost by announcing the
incorrect range. This potential cost, determined endogenously, is driven by how the
lie affects expectations as shown below.
For simplicity, following Crawford and Sobel (1982) in their example and Stein
(1989), suppose that S~has a uniform distribution, bounded by [—D, D}. A general
partition equilibrium of size n (i.e., with n subintervals) is characterized by n — 1
11dividing points a1, a2,• , a,,_1, where a0
= —D and a~= D are the boundary
conditions.
Given an announcement by the monetary authority, saythe interval (a1_i, a,), and
(14), wage setters will form expectations according to the following:
* ________ it (a1_i,a~)=ir — 2 (17)
With this influence on wage setters expectations, it is important to ensure that the
monetary authority will announce the correct range. For example, if ft E {a~_i,a~],
the monetary authority, wanting to overstate its forecast, should not announce the
interval (ai,a1+i). To guarantee that the monetary authority will not misrepresent
the range in which f~ falls, it must always be indifferent between announcing the
ranges, (a~_i,a~) and (a~,ai+i)when ft = a~,for i = 1,2,.~,n —1. Formally, this
condition, called the arbitrage condition, is written as
U[(a~_i, ai), ft] = LTT[(a~,a~~i), ft] (18)
or equivalently,
a1
— a~ — Ct — = E[ai +a~+i— a~ — ~t — y~]2, (19)




— a~_1 + 4y~ (20)
for i = ~ ,n — 1. Noting that a0
= —D, the solution to this second-order
difference equation can be expressed in terms of a1:
a, = a1i + D(i — 1) + 2i(i — i)~* (21)
for i = 1,2,... ,n.
12The subintervals, as defined by the partitions in (20), make the cost of overstating
the value of ft sufficiently large to induce the monetary authority to announce the
correct range for all ft. From (19) or (20), one can verify that the positioning of the
partitions in the whole interval [—D,D] is such that for smaller ft the announcement
is more precise — i.e., informative. The intuition here is that, in equilibrium, when
the disturbance is smaller (more negative), the monetary authority’s announcement is
more revealing in that it is less likely to be contaminated by the monetary authority’s
incentive to overstate the value of the forecast. Thus, the implicit cost imposed
by the partitions to induce the monetary authority to announce the correct range
can be smaller for smaller ft. Conversely, for larger ft, the monetary authority
can communicate less precisely. Since its announcement is more likely to reflect its
incentive to surprise wage setters with larger ft, the monetary authority must be
disciplined more strongly by being able to communicate only in more ambiguous
terms. In fact, when ft is larger, the monetary authority has a greater desire to
reveal some information about f~ rather than none. Hence, at the same time it wants
to communicate the most, the monetary authority can do so least precisely.
The largest possible n — that is, the finest partition equilibrium — is the largest
integer i such that i(i — i)y* < D, which is simply the smallest integer, n, greater
than or equal to
(21)
2
The expression above reveals that as y* decreases relative to D, the largest possible
n can be larger so that there can be more partitions. Conversely, as the output goals
of the monetary authority and wage setters diverge, there is less room for making
the equilibrium informative. In a different context, Sobel (1988) shows that cheap
talk cannot work when there is a sufficiently large wedge between the two players’
goals. Indeed, in the present model, when y’~exceeds ~-, there can be no meaningful
13announcements; in this case, the largest possible n equals one.
In contrast to Stein’s (1989) analysis in which there are a countable infinity of
equilibria, in the present analysis there are a finite number of equilibria since the
conflict of interest parameter, y~,is an exogenously given constant. In what follows,
the discussion focuseson the equilibrium with the largest number ofpartitions among
all those partition equilibria of size n that are feasible, because, as shown below, the
monetary authority strictly prefers (in an ex-ante sense) partition equilibria with
more steps. (See Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) theorem 5.)
Although a constant money growth rule is not the first-best policy in that it
does not permit efficient reactions to the predictable component of money demand
disturbances, it does allow the monetary authority to make noisy announcements and
enhance its welfare, provided that the difference between the output goals of wage
setters and the monetary authority, captured by the term y’~,is not too large. To
calculate the expected one-period utility, note first that a1 can be solved using (20)
and the boundary condition a,, = D:
— (2 — n)D — 2n(n —
a1— 2
n
Combining (22) and (20) yields
= — D + 2y*i(i — n) (23a)
a~—a~_1
= ~+2y*(2i_n_1) (23b)
Finally, using (23b) and (6), the monetary authority’s expected one-period utility
can be written as







14where F(S~)denotes the distribution function of S~and the assumption that S~is
uniformly distributed has been used. From (24), one can establish that the monetary
authority’s expected one-period utility is increasing in n, for n < ~ Hence, the
monetary authority would like to make more precise announcements the larger is the
variance of S~and the smaller is y~.But, since the largest possible n determined by
the restriction in (21) is less than ~ the monetary authority can only maintain
the maximum degree of precision in its announcements that does not jeopardize their
credibility.
Comparing (24) to the monetary authority’s expected one-period utility when it
follows the constant money growth rule but makes no announcements, given by (14)
where cr1 = under the specifications made abovefor the distribution of St, indicates
that noisy announcements with n subintervals are always useful if y” < ‘~. But this
requirement is always satisfied by the condition that a partition equilibrium of size
n is feasible. (Seeequation (21).)
3.3 Noisy Announcements Need Not Be Cheap
As argued in section 3.1, noisy announcements alone cannot be a meaningful policy
tool in the present context. If, however, the monetary authority’s private informa-
tion were modeled as in Stein’s (1989) analysis, noisy announcements could effect a
more efficient outcome than the full-discretionary solution without a cost and, hence,
be referred to as cheap talk. For example, suppose that the monetary authority’s
target rate of inflation, it”, in (5) were private information, varying among different
policymakers, but that ft were known by all. Cheap talk about ir~’,then, would
enhance costlessly the monetary authority’s welfare above that obtained in the full-
discretionary regime without any announcements. Even in this case, however, cheap
talk would not support the efficientoutcome since the monetary authority’s incentive
to generate surprise inflation remains.9
15In the present framework, noisyannouncements implicitly impose a cost, requiring
limited flexibility in policy, e.g., a constant money growth rule. Unless the private
information were verifiable, limiting flexibility in policy is necessary to diminish the
equilibrium inflationary bias. Thus, noisy announcements are not cheap talk in the
present analysis. Although, as shown in the previous section, noisy announcements
will improve upon the outcome with a strict constant growth rule, given the lim-
its on flexibility required to make noisy announcements meaningful, they will not
always be preferred overthe full-discretionary policy by the monetary authority. In-
deed, a stronger condition must be satisfied for a constant money growth rule with
noisy announcements to dominate the full-discretionary policy. From (10) and (24),
the monetary authority’s expected one-period utility in the full-discretionary regime
will be less than that with noisy announcements and a constant money growth rule
provided that
~(n2~+ 1)cr~+ (n2
— 1)crl +n2(~ — fl 1)y~ >0 (25)
Although this condition is weaker than that for the strict constant money growth
rule without announcements to dominate the full-discretionary policy, it restricts the
scope of noisy announcements in monetary policy substantially.
To see how the monetary authority’s preferences for the constant money growth
rule with noisy announcements depends on the degree of accuracy of its forecast,
define a2 ~ where 0 < a < 1. Noting that ~1= (1 — a2)crl, the condition in (25)
can be written as




As the accuracy of the monetary authority’s forecast falls (Le., as a moves from one
to zero), the expected benefit of maintained flexibility in policy permitting reactions
to the information falls relativeto theexpected gainfrom eliminating the inflationary
16bias. Hence, as a approaches zero, the monetary authority is more likely to prefer the
constant money growth rule with noisyannouncements. Conversely, as a approaches
one, the full-discretionary regime is more likely to be preferred.
In fact, the expression in (26) implies that as a goes to one, a sufficient condition
for the full-discretionary policy to dominate a constant money growth rule with noisy
announcements is ~ ~ (n~1)’ for n > 1. Since this condition is least likely to be
satisfied for n = 2, noisy announcements will not be advantageous to the monetary
authority if q~ ~ 1 as a approaches one. To interpret this result, recall that q5
=
if the weight the monetary authority attaches to its goal of inflation stability exceeds
the square of the elasticity of output with respect to unanticipated inflation, 02, then
noisy announcements will not be preferred over the full-discretionary policy by the
monetary authority. As q5 increases, the monetary authority’s willingness to act on its
incentive to create surprise inflation becomes smaller, thereby reducing the possible
benefits of eliminating the (smaller) inflationary bias relative to the costs of the lost
flexibility necessary to make noisy announcements meaningful.
More generally, the condition in (25) implies that noisy announcements will more
likely be preferred over no announcements with full flexibility in monetary policy the
smaller is the accuracy of the monetary authority’s forecast (the value of flexibility
in monetary policy) and the larger is the difference between the output goals of
the monetary authority and wage setters (the magnitude by which the monetary
authority would like to overstate the value of ft for a given 0).
This seemingly contradictory result underscores the implication of the two di-
mensional nature of the incentive problem in this framework. As in Stein (1989),
when noisy announcements are examined alone, they can be more informative as
the difference between the monetary authority’s output goal and that of wage setter
decreases relative to the variance of the money demand disturbance. (See equation
(21)). When noisy announcements are examined in a broader context wherein there
17exists a trade-off between flexibility and discipline, however, this result must be quali-
fied. In particular, although announcements can be more informative as y* decreases,
the cost of the lost flexibility required to make them credible, at the same time, be-
comes larger relative to the benefit of avoiding the inflationary bias. Hence, if noisy
announcements are observed in equilibrium, they are not likely to be particularly
informative.
It should be noted that by examining noisy announcements in conjunction with a
strict money growth rule,the analysis has in some sense focused on the lower bound of
noisy announcements. Nevertheless, examining noisy announcements in conjunction
with a less restrictive policy rule would not change the results qualitatively. For
example, the above analysis would not be qualitatively affected by employing a more
general multi-period targeting procedure rather than a simple constant money growth
rule. As in Garfinkel and Oh (1989), the targeting procedure would partly tie the
hands of the monetary authority, leaving some flexibility to permit the monetary
authority to react to its private information. Although this less restrictive rule cannot
perfectly eliminate the inflationary bias, combined with noisy announcements, it
might yield a better outcome than that analyzed here but not substantially.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated the feasibility of reducing the degree of secrecy in mone-
tary policy. Although the monetary authority cannot make precise statements about
its private information, it can make noisy announcements. As in Stein (1989) where
the credibility problem is one-dimensional and the monetary authority’s incentive
to misrepresent its private information depends on that information, this form of
communication is costless in the sense that no resources are expended in the process.
But, with the more general characterization of the credibility problem presented here,
18noisy announcements are costly in terms of the flexibility that must be sacrificed to
make them meaningful. It should be noted, however, that not all flexibility needs
to be abandoned from policy. Rather, to make noisy announcements an effective
form of communication, imposed policy rules cannot specify explicit reactions to the
monetary authority’s private information. Nevertheless, to the extent that flexibil-
ity in policy is limited, noisy announcements might be considered a costly method
of partially resolving the credibility problem. Indeed, the analysis predicts that if
a noisy announcement equilibrium were observed, the announcements might not be
especially informative.
One possible extension of the analysis left for future research, would be to model S,~
and the private information, ft, as having a persistent component. In this extension,
where ft is serially correlated, the monetary authority could transmit a noisy signal
about the persistent component of ft through its policy in time t to influence next
period’s inflationary expectations. In this case, however, noisy announcements used
in an effort to update inflationary expectations upon the realization of ft+i could
not be credible unless flexibility in policy were limited somehow. But if flexibility
were limited through, for example, a multi-period average money growth rule, noisy
announcements could serve as a complimentary form of noisy communication.
19Footnotes
1. See Goodfriend (1986) for a useful critique of the arguments made for main-
tained secrecy in monetary policy by the Federal Open Market Committee.
2. An inflationary bias in policy potentially arises when the monetary authority
has an incentive to create surprise inflation, taking advantage of temporary nominal
rigidities in the economy in an effort to augment output. Provided that economic
agents suspect that the monetary authority will act on its incentive to create surprises,
the equilibrium can be characterized by an inflationary bias.
3. See Canzoneri (1985), Flood and Isard (1988), and Garfinkel and Oh (1990).
Interpreting the degree of flexibility in policy in a slightly different way, Rogoff (1985)
shows how this trade-off between flexibility anddiscipline can arise without the pres-
ence of private information. Persson and Tabellini (1990) provide a useful discussion
about this trade-off.
4. In Stein’s (1989) analysis, where the efficient outcome would obtain if there
were no private information, this trade-off does not arise.
5. As will become evident, the only difference is in terms of the sequence ofevents.
The change made in the timing of the model is necessary to analyze the role of noisy
announcements.
6. It is not crucial that wage setters do not make a forecast of the money demand
disturbance. Even ifthey had a fairly accurate forecast, the analysis below is relevant
provided that the monetary authority’s forecast is inside information.
7. See Canzoneri (1985, pp. 1058-59) for a brief discussion of possible motivations
of the assumption that k> 1.
8. As discussed below, by studying noisy announcements with this strict rule, the
analysis focuses on the lower bound of the possible value of such announcements.
Employing a less restrictive rule, such as a multi-period targeting procedure, does
20not changethe analysis to follow qualitatively, however. See Garfinkel and Oh (1990)
for a general discussion about the attractiveness of the legislative approach to re-
solve the credibility problem partly when the monetary authority possesses is private
information. Note that reputational concerns might be able to substitute, at least
to some extent, for a commitment technology to induce the monetary authority to
follow a constant money growth rule.
9. Note that noisy announcements can be credible when ir~rather than ft is
the private information because, in this case, the monetary authority’s incentive to
lie depends on its private information. Although this alternative formulation of the
problem is similar to Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), the process of communication
in that analysis is not cheap talk. Because the monetary authority partially signals
information about its randomly changing preferences through policy actions rather
than mere words, it is not costless. Nevertheless, as in the alternative formulation of
the problem with non-verifiable privateinformation, the noisyform ofcommunication
in Cukierman and Meltzer need not support the efficient outcome.
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